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SETON HALL COURSE - FALL SEMESTER, 2010
JOHN C. WHITEHEAD SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY
REVISED: OCTOBER 19, 2010

TALKING WITH THE ENEMY:
An Investigation of US Efforts to Talk with the Enemy
from 1933 to the Present.
Instructor: Ambassador William Liters former President of the United Nations Association of
the USA (UNA USA), former President of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and 31 year veteran
of US Foreign Service. In the Foreign Service Mr. Liters served as US Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia ( 1983-1986 ) and Venezuela, ( 1978- 1982) and held numerous posts in Italy,
Germany, the Soviet Union, and in the Department of State, where he was the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Europe ( 1977-1978) and for the Inter-American Affairs ( 1975-1977). He also
taught a seminar on Soviet Politics at Johns Hopkins SAIS ( 1965 69), at GW (1973-76) and at
the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton ( 1983) on US policy toward Central America. He
taught a similar course on " Talking with the Enemy" at Tufts University in the fall of 2009 and
at Hamilton College and Columbia University in the spring of 2010.
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Description of Course: Through a detailed investigation of a series of case studies, this course
will take a close look at past efforts of the United States to manage relations with “enemies” or
adversaries. The course will examine the different strategies Presidents have used to enter
conflict or to “talk with the enemy” : Roosevelt’s 1933 opening of relations with the USSR; the
decision at Munich to “appease’ Hitler; Truman’s decision to drop the nuclear bomb on
Hiroshima, Nixon’s opening to China; the decision to Americanize the war in Vietnam rather
than negotiate: the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and the debates over US policy in Afghanistan
and whether the US should talk directly with Iran The course will undertake some examination
of how the US might deal with groups in the new paradigm of non-state actors such as Taliban,
Hamas, and Hezbollah. The course will also seek to explore the various theories connected with
decision making in analyzing historical events.

Course Themes: Several key themes will be interwoven throughout the course, including

•

Managing relations with the ‘adversary” or “enemy” has been shaped by trusted and loyal
advisers to the President who have not always been the most experienced and
knowledgeable on the nature of the enemy or on the issues involved. This lack of
understanding of the enemy has led to occasional serious mistakes and missed
opportunities. It has also on occasion led to creative approaches that were avoided by the
professionals.

r

•

Departments of government and Congressional leaders have often opposed presidential
policy choices on how best to deal with the enemy * How have the president and his
advisers dealt with this opposition and did the opposition impact the outcome?

•

The discussions will include how US decision makers are influenced by domestic factors
such as elections and the media. In each case study we will explore to what degree
historical and cultural bias or ignorance has hindered efforts to open up discussions with
an adversary that would be in US interest.

•

The techniques used by the US government for supplementing or reinforcing direct
diplomatic relations, such as multilateral action, track II diplomacy, or alternative
methods of bypassing formal channels will also be explored for each case study.

•

The decision to use military force rather than engage an adversary is a quintessential
presidential decision. Presidents have often failed when going to war with an adversary to
define the objectives of the use of force and to outline an exit strategy.

Requirements: Students are expected to complete all required reading before each session. The
readings are divided into the categories of required and optional. Students are encouraged to look
at the Optional reading materials.

(

1) Students will be asked to write a short paper of about 300 words on the readings or related
to the readings for each session except for the opening class and for those classes that involve
simulation... The professor will draw on these papers for discussion and three times during the
semester provide feedback to each student on the student’s class work.

2) A 15 page research paper on a subject of the student’s choosine related to the course work
will be due at the end of the semester. Each student will examine a Presidential decision relating
to dealing with an adversary and will reach an agreement with the professor on theme of the
paper. Agreement should be reached in early November on the theme for each student’s paper.
The paper should establish at the outset a proposition about a Presidential decision (for example
did it further US interests, were there unanticipated consequences, did the President take or not
take the advice of the best informed advisers, did the decision achieve what it was designed to
achieve, did the President’s domestic political considerations seem overriding, etc) . Then the
paper will support and explain the proposition. This paper will require original source research
with footnotes or endnotes...
3) Three students will be expected to participate on a rotating basis for each session in doing
research to brief the class prior on the historic context of the case study being considered at the
next class session. : For example for the second session three students will be asked to prepare a
background briefing to the class at the end of the session to prepare the group for reading for the
third class (“Munich”). The Professor will hope to organize teams of three who will work
together throughout the semester in this briefing program:
a) One student will give a short oral briefing (5 minutes) on the historic backdrop for the
case study

2

b) A second student will give a short oral report (5 minutes) on the domestic
environment: including Congressional attitudes, public opinion and media on the given problem

{

c) A third student will give a short oral report (5 minutes) on the attitudes of the
adversary toward how best to deal with the United States at the particularly time being discussed .

4) One or more times during the semester students will be asked to simulate a decisionmaking meeting with a president leading toward a final decision. Each student will play the
role of real individuals in a meeting of the cabinet or the National Security Council .

5) Students will be graded on their short papers (25%), on their class participation (25 %) and
on their final paper (50%). The class participation will include the ability to serve as briefer
for the reading, participate intelligently in the simulation, and engage in the discussion of the
reading. The professor will give letter grades and try to keep each student informed of
progress during the semester.

-

Monday, August 30, 2010 CLASS 1
The Setting for the Course - Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
f

^

The approaches that Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson took toward US foreign relations in
the early 20th Century become the book ends for how US presidents have approached the matter
of dealing with the “enemy” ever since. This class will explore the difference between these
approaches and the role of the debate between “realists” and the Wilsonian policy makers in
shaping US foreign relations and presidential decisions . This first session will also review the
unusual American reluctance to use diplomatic relations as a routine tool to do the business of
states and to defend American security. In addition to becoming familiar with these two almost
uniquely American individual presidents and trends that have shaped the thinking of virtually
every subsequent US president , the class will discuss some of the theory behind the decision
making approach to the study of history.

Readings:

•

Brady, James, “The Imperial Cruise A Secret History of Empire and War, 2009 ,
Required Chapters 2 ( pages 11 -60) and Optional Chapter 1 ( pages 1 -11 ) and
Chapter 13 ( pages 321 333)

-

-

•

Cooper, John Milton, “ Woodrow Wilson”, 2009, Required Prologue ( pages 3 12) and
Optional Chapters 20 22 ( pages 454-534). 1 would recommend reading however at
least Chapter 22, the Fight for the League.

•

Kissinger, Henry, “ Diplomacy”, Optional Chapters 9-12 ( pages 218-331 ). !
recommend you become familiar with Kissinger’s writing on Wilson and other
“idealists” or liberal internationalists. I-Iis book also provides worthy setting for
World War II.

-
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•

Thomas, Evan, “The War Lovers”, 2010. Required: Introduction Chapter ( pages 313) and Chapter 23 ( pages 397 - 413). This is a recent popular history of three men
who shaped one aspect of the American presidential attitude toward conflict and the
“enemy” in subsequent decades.

•

Rosati, Jerel A ., Required: “The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World
Politics” International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 ( Autumn, 2000), pp. 45-75. This
scholarly essay lays out some of the theoretical approaches to decision making.

Class Preparation : Prepare for this first class by doing the required reading, dipping into the
optional reading. The professor will ask each of you about your thoughts on “what is an enemy”
and on why you have chosen to take this course. Three of you will be asked in this first class to
prepare a briefing for the end of the next class on the background setting for the Munich
Agreement discussion in the third class.

Monday, September 13, 2010 - CLASS 2
Changing Relations with the Soviet Union

f

The establishment of relations with USSR in 1933 was a presidentially managed undertaking
between the US and a large adversarial state with some opposition from members of the cabinet
including from the Department of State. This session will also take a close look at Roosevelt’s
decision to open to the USSR at the beginning of the era of Stalin ’s Great Terror in which many
millions of Soviet citizens were killed . The new relationship laid the groundwork for the alliance
with the Soviets during WWII and prepared the US for a better understanding of the Soviet
Union during the long Cold War.

Students will read an article outlining some of the main factors that have influenced individual
decision-makers in U.S. foreign policy throughout recent history, as well as a short piece
introducing the ways in which the U .S. has traditionally talked with its “enemies.” This article
briefly outlines the difference between non-recognition and a breach in diplomatic relations.
Readings:

<v.

•

Bennett, Edward M . “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: AmericanSoviet Relations, 1933-1939.” ( 1985), pp. 1 -24.

•

Bcrridgc, G.R . “Talking to the Enemy: How States Without ‘Diplomatic Relations’
Communicate” (1994). pp. xiii-12.

•

Bishop, Donald G. “The Roosevelt - Litvinov Agreements: The American View"
( 1965), pp. 1 -26.

•

Baer, George W. “A Question of Trust: The Origins of U .S.-Soviet Diplomatic
Relations: The Memoirs of Loy W. Henderson” ( 1986), pp. 227-243.

4
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Class Preparation : All of the reading is required for this class. Prepare a short paper (330
words) asking a question about the reading or addressing a particular issue that you found
interesting or provocative. I will use your questions and observations as a basis for class
discussion. Three of you will brief the class on the Munich /Nazi Germany session for the coming
week.

Monday September 20, 2010 - CLASS 3
Munich/Nazi Germany/ World War II - 1938
Even though the US was not a direct party to the Munich agreement with Hitler in 1938,
Roosevelt played a key role in bringing Britain, France, Italy and Hitler to the negotiating table
and in convincing them not to break off negotiations. As in the case of recognition of the Soviet
Union in 1933 , domestic factors such as isolationist tendencies and a strong U .S. desire for peace
colored and shaped Roosevelt’s behavior in light of the crisis. This event conditioned American
leaders on how not to “deal with the enemy”, and as such the “ Munich appeasement” shaped the
thinking of American presidents on dealing with adversaries for decades.
Readings:

(

•

Famham , Barbara Rearden, “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political
Decision-Making” (1997) pp. 91 - 128 .

•

Munich Pact, September 29, 1938.

•

YOUTUBE "The Munich betrayal 1938"
www.youtube.com / watch ?v = nZHpprf6 HSM &feature = related

•

Bennett, Edward M. “ Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security:
American-Soviet Relations, 1933- 1939.” ( 1985), pp 127-152. [ADDED]

•

Dallek , Robert. “ Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945”
( 1995) pp. 144- 168. [ ADDED ]

Class Preparation : All the reading is required for this class. Write a short paper (300 words)
summarizing in your words why President Roosevelt supported the Munich Pact. In addition
provide the Professor on short question about the reading. At the end of the class three of you
will brief the class on the historic setting for the dropping of the list nuclear bomb on Hiroshima.

S
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Monday, September 27, 2010 - CLASS 4
Hiroshima and the End of World War II - 1945
The controversy over President Truman’s decision to drop the first nuclear bomb on Hiroshima
in August of 1945 continues to be debated among historians and analysts of presidential decision
making. Some “revisionist” historians have argued that President Truman was fully aware of a
Japanese offer for a peace settlement in the summer of 1945 so that the bomb was not necessary.
The conventional history suggests that the conditions suggested by the Japanese for their
surrender were unacceptable and the alternatives were either to prolong the war which would
include the invasion of Japan and the loss of possibly millions of lives or drop the bomb. The
moral argument against using the atomic bomb has also loomed over that decision. In this case
study, students will examine current interpretations of this controversial decision and read some
of the new material that has come to light from declassified messages. We will examine which of
Truman’s main advisers were most critical in moving President Truman to that decision

-

•

Bernstein, Barton J ., "Roosevelt, Truman and the Atomic Bomb, 1941 1945: A
Reinterpretation " Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, no. 1 (Spring 1975, pp. 23-69)

•

Frank, Richard B " Ending the Pacific War; Harry Truman and the Decision to Drop the
Bomb". Foreign Policy Research Institute. ( April 2009) vol. 14, no. 4

•

Racing

<

the Enemy. Hasegawa , Tsuyoshi. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2005)

-

o Chapter 4: Potsdam: The Turning Point (pp. 130 176)
o Chapter 5: The Atomic Bombs ( pp. 177-214
o (OPTIONAL) Conclusion: Assessing the Roads Not Taken ( pp. 290 -303)

•

The Potsdam Proclamation ( primary document)

•

YOUTUBE “ Harry S Truman 's announcement on Bombing of Hiroshima
www. youtube.comAvatch? v = POPmlHlaOtM&featu re-related

•

YOUTUBE “ President Truman on Nuclear Decision in WWII"
www. youtube.com/ watch? v= 9Q01FURCY8fi

Class Preparation : Read the required reading. The Conclusion of Racing the Enemy is optional.
The paper should be a 300 word statement of your view on Truman’s going forward with the
plans to drop the bomb on Hiroshima. Did Truman make the right decision and indeed did he
actually make the decision. Three of you will brief the class on the historical setting for the
Korean War leading up to the truce.
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Monday, October 4, 2010 - CLASS 5
Agreement on a Truce That Suspended The Korean War - 1953
In 1953 President Eisenhower made the decision, after two years of troubled negotiations, to
reach a truce, without a peace treaty, to end the war on the Korean peninsula. The stalemate in
the war and the high cost of life, plus the general world environment about this costly and
seemingly un-winnable war caused President Eisenhower to take the unusual step to stop the
fighting. The terms of the truce left a heritage of conflict on that peninsula that has remained a
factor of stability in that part of the world for decades. Indeed one of the objectives of any
settlement that might be reached between the US and North Korea and between the two Koreas
would most certainly have to be a final Peace Treaty fonnally closing that war. We will explore
the decision that the president made and the considerations that went into this unusual truce.
Readings:
Stueck , William “Origins of the Korean War." ( pp. 10-46). The Korean War 1995

(

•

Stueck , William . “ Diplomacy Fails.” ( pp. 85-105). The Korean War

•

Hess, Gary “Truman as Commander in Chief ’ ( pp. 42 - 74) in Presidential Decisions for
War (OPTIONAL)

•

Foot, Rosemary “Chapter 7: The Strategy for Ending the War” ( pp. 204-231) The Wrong

•

Foot, Rosemary “Chapter 8: Conclusions ( pp. 232 - 246). The Wrong War 1985

•
•

Stueck , William . “Concluding an Armistice.” (pp. 341-347). The Korean War 1995

War 1985

Cummings, Bruce, Chapter 9: Requiem : History in the Temper of Reconciliation”
(pp 225-243), The Korean War 2010 (OPTIONAL)

• NSC-147, “Analysis of Possible Outcomes of Action in Korea” April 2, 1953
• “Public Opinion Polling Korea” June 1953
Class Preparation : Read the required reading. Prepare a 500 word “opinion editorial” for the
New York Times that takes a position on whether the Korean Armistice was the correct,
incorrect or take another position in between . Three of you will brief the class on the historical
context of the session on Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

7
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Monday, October 18, 2010 - CLASS 6
President Eisenhower's Decision to Talk with Khrushchev - 1959
By 1959, President Eisenhower, looking to his final year as President, decided it was time to
move toward a new more direct relationship with the post Stalinist Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev. This decision was driven by Eisenhower’s own concern with the increasingly tense
nature of the Cold War and with the mounting nuclear weapons capacity of the Soviet Union.
The role of Khrushchev, who had only recently denounced Stalin, was also important. In the
summer of 1959 the first US Exhibition opened in Moscow (Nixon’s famous “kitchen debate”
with Khrushchev) and Khrushchev visited the US and met with President Eisenhower. This visit
opened a new era in the Cold War and demonstrated the impact of a new set of advisors on
Eisenhower as he began to contemplate his legacy. Virtually every American president would
follow Eisenhower’s decision to turn to seeking agreements with the Soviet Union at least as
they approached their final years of office. We will also explore in this session briefly the way
the US government in some cases in the past has chosen to take action to promote “regime
change” in nations as a way to manage difficult enemies .

-

Readings:

Beschloss, Michael, “ Mayday, Eisenhower. Khrushchev , and the U -2 Affair”
Chapters 7, 8 and 9.

(

Kinzer, Stephen, “Overthrow America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to
Iraq”, 2006. Introduction ( pages 1 -6), Chapters 5 and 6 ( pages 111- 147).
YOUTUBE Eisenhower announces Khrushchev is visiting. "Eisenhower &
Khrushchev, New Diplomacy 195978/3"
www.voutube.com/watch7 v LSJ DoOYOJM

—

YOUTUBE " Nikita Khrushchev's Great American Tour"
www .VQUtube.com / watch7 v~zOOb 1 wAsbio&fcature= rclatcd
YOUTUBE “Nixon & Khrushchev, USSR Opening US Fair 1959/7/27
www. voutube.com /watch?v P IJI S9wAGbA

—

Class Preparation : All the reading is required and you will find the YOUTUBE material
interesting. Prepare a 300 word question or observation on an aspect of your reading you found
particularly interesting or confusing.

B

(

Monday, October 25, 2010 - CLASS 7
Cuban Missile Crisis -1962
The Cuban missile a crisis in 1962 is one oft he best documented and fully assessed decisions by
a president on the decision for or against the use of force. This session will explore the recent
literature on the decision making process and test the themes on what wc can learn from the
process that led President Kennedy opt against the use of force against Cuba . We will explore the
qualities of the president’s closest advisers (the “Exxcom ), the role of outside advisers, and the
experience the president himself brought to his decision;
Readings
*

Freedman, Lawrence, "Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam" (2000),
Chapters 19 - 23, pp. 170 - 217.

* Blight, J .G ., J .S. Nye, D. A. Welch, "The Cuban
Affairs 66 (1987), pp. 170 188.

-

Missile Crisis Revisited," Foreign

* Allison, Graham and Zclikov, Philip, “ Essence of Decision , Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis” (1999), pp 1 12 and pp 379 407 ( ADDED ]

-

-

.

* (OPTIONAL)"The Kennedy Tapes: inside the White House during the Cuban Missile

Crisis" edited by Ernest May and Philip Zelikow; (2002), pp. 107 - 122.

(
Class Preparation : Prepare your role for a class simulation of October 25 , 1962 meetings of the
EXCOM in the WH on the crisis. Four of you will provide the class the historical setting for the
EXCOM simulation and provide a short briefing on what transpired in the EXCOM prior to the
October 25 session. There will be no paper required for this meeting. Four of you at the end of
the class will provide a briefing for the next session, the decision to Americanize the War in
Vietnam.

Monday, November 1, 2009 - CLASS 8
The Decision to Americanize the War in Vietnam
Vietnam was the formative US foreign policy venture after WWII. There were times when better
choices could have been made instead of further escalation of the military conflict - choices that
were not taken, involving dealing in a different way with adversaries. In preparation for this class
students will be asked to read books on the role of McNamara and McGeorge Bundy who were
key protagonists in Johnson’s decision to keep escalating the US military presence in Vietnam .
We will examine the particular role of these two advisers and try to determine their reasons for
making recommendations in 1965 that brought about President Johnson’s decision to deploy US
combat troops to Vietnam and to continue to escalate the war.

L
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Readings:

•

Goldstein, Gordon M . “Lessons in Disaster McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in
Vietnam” (2008), pp. 97 137.

•

McNamara, Robert “ In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam ” ( 1995)
Chapter 6 ( pp. 145-168) and Chapter 7 , pp. 169 - 206.

•

FILM: “The Fog of War,” Robert McNamara

Class Preparation : The professor encourages all of you who have not seen
“ The Fog of War” to view it on your own since it has been difficult to work out a time for a
class showing. All the reading is required as is the film. The professor will work with the
class to set up a debate on the decisions in 1964- 65 that led to the significant increase in
American troops in Vietnam. Team A will argue for President Johnson’s decision and
Team B will argue against the decision to significantly increase US ground forces in
Vietnam . In addition each of you will be asked to write a Memorandum to The President
from one of the actors in the Johnson Administration of about 500 words, giving your
recommendations on what the President should do about the US role in Vietnam. This
memorandum does not have to take the position you will be required to take in the debate.
Four of you will brief the class on the historical setting for the next session on China .
[ CHANGEDI

(
Monday, November 8, 2010 - CLASS 9
Changing Relations with China - 1972
The style that Nixon/ Kissinger used in opening up the relations with China in 1972 and the
timing of that initiative are instructive for future state-state relations, such as evolving US Iran
relations today. Note that the Nixon initiative found a response in China, which was in the
middle of the Cultural Revolution arguably one of the most repressive periods of Mao’s China.
This session will address how the president made his decision with a small group of advisers
and, like in the case of Roosevelt in 1933, with opposition from the Department of State. The
new relationship helped the US learn about and understand China far better than before through
dealing with the Chinese officials and interacting with Chinese society at many levels even
before the establishment of diplomatic relations.

-

•

The Joint U .S. China Communique, Shanghai, February 27 , 1972

•

McMillan, Margaret “ Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World" (2007),
pp. 184 207, pp. 230 244.

•

Ross, Robert S. “ International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: U .S. -China Relations
since 1972 (1986), pp. 255-287.

-

-
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-

•

Accinelli, Robert, “In Pursuit of a Modus Vivendi: The Taiwan Issue and Sino American
Rapprochement 1969 1972” ,Chapter 1 ( pp 9 55) (OPTIONAL)

•

“ My Talks with Chou En -Lai,” Top Secret Memorandum: Henry A . Kissinger to Nixon .
July 14, 1971 .

•

YOUTUBE " History: Feb 1972 President Nixon ’s Visit to China ( 3 / 6) 1972 / 2 / 21"
http:/ / www.voutube .com / watch ?v-XUMkl81xVw4&feature = related

-

-

YOUTUBE Chinese Footage, "Chairman Mao Zedong and Nixon
www.voutubc.com /watch? v =ahWLRV-K.blc & fcaturc~ related
YOUTUBE Nial Ferguson's "Nixon in China":
http:// www . voutube.com /watch7 v ' N 5V 9sP nDCM&fcaturc relatcd

-

Class Preparation : The professor would hope you do all the reading and particularly
recommends reading Kissinger ’s “Top Secret Memorandum". Write a 300 word statement on
who was most responsible for the decision to open to China and who in Nixon’s cabinet was
opposed or uninformed. Four of you will brief the class on the Nixon Brezhnev Summit in 1973.

(

Monday, November 15, 2010 - CLASS 10
DETENTE - The Nixon/ Brezhnev Summit in DC 1973
The Nixon administration went into the 1973 summit with the strategic opening to China in
place, a wide range of proposals to broaden relations with the Soviet Union in anns control and
other areas, and a re-elected President beginning his second administration. The climate for this
experienced Nixon/Kissinger team at one level was positive. Yet there was growing domestic
opposition to detente with the Soviet Union at home, the Vietnam War was going badly and the
US was looking at withdrawal , and most importantly the Watergate allegations were building
against Nixon creating the beginning of a crisis year for the President which would increasingly
cast a shadow over his presidency and over the goals of detente and lead toward Nixon’s
resignation in 1974. The agreements at the crucial 1973 summit meeting reflected many of the
aspirations and the worries of President Nixon. By now Nixon was making most of the critical
decisions on all key foreign policy issues with his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger
while Secretary of State Rogers and the Department of State were only tangentially involved .
Readings:

• "Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year" by Alistair Home (2008) Chapter 7

C
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c

•

" Nixon in the World : American Foreign Relations, 1969 1977" by Fredrik Logevall
and Andrew Preston ( 2008) Chapters to be selected .

•

" Detente and

*

-

Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan" by
Raymond L. Garthoff (1994) Chapter 9: " Detente Launched : The first Nixon Brezhnev Summit, May 1972" ( pp. 325 - 359) Chapter 10: " Developing Detente: The
Second Summit, June 1973" ( pp. 360 403)

-

Class Preparation: Read the required reading. Prepare a brief ( 300 word) memorandum
asking a question or making an observation on President Nixon ’s management of this
summit meeting. Four of you will brief the class on the role of the UN in Afghanistan since
2001 in preparation for the next meeting which will be sitting in one the address of UN
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in the late afternoon of November 22. There will be no
class but all students arc required to attend the address of the UN Secretary General .
There will be no opportunity to brief the class on the two wars in Iraq. [CHANGED )

Monday, November 22, 2010 - CLASS 11

(

The Address of Scton Hall by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in the late afternoon. In
lieu of the class session, all students in this class will attend the speech of the Secretary
General. Class Preparations. Please write a 300 word OPED on a different role (enlarged ,
reduced, and adjusted) that the UN might play in Afghanistan in the context of the
President’s decision over the next few months on US policy toward Afghanistan .
[ CHANGED ]

Monday, November 29, 2010 - CLASS 12

—

The Two Wars in Iraq 1990-91 and 2003- prcscnt . These two wars will be dealt with
together in view of the need to cancel the November 22 meeting of the class.

A. The First Gulf War

1990-91 . [CHANGED )

In response to Iraq ’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 of Kuwait President GHW Bush mounted a US
effort to develop international support against Iraq for its violation of the UN Charter. Immediate
efforts were undertaken through the UN Security Council to sanction and call on Iraq to
withdraw immediately. After much personal effort by President Bush and his team to develop
wide spread support for military operations against Saddam Hussein should lie not agree to
withdraw, the US lead a UN authorized force to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in January
February 1991. This action drew widespread approval of the world community and much of the
cost was paid for by countries in the neighborhood. President Bush’s decision to command US
troops to lead a multilateral force was well considered . His decision also included an agreement
to set the limited objective of removing Iraq from Kuwait as part of the limited objective of the
war and as part of the effort to get international backing for the action. Yet the Gulf War did not

-
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lead to the fall of Saddam Hussein and a decade later the second President Bush set out to correct
that problem by invading Iraq

Readings:
Frankel, Glenn, Lines in the Sand Washington Post National Weekly Edition,
September 10, 1990 4 pages.

-

Bush, President George HW and Brent Scowcroft , Chpl 5-19, A World Transformed
(OPTIONAL)

YOUTUBE George H W Bush Announces War Against Iraq (January 16 1991 )
www.voutube.com/watch? v= IFmOIIaOWoA& feature= PlavList &p- C5 F 1041 D6C9CCD
EO& index
Yetiv, Steve A. US- Decision Making and the Persian Gulf War ( 2004)

• "Rational Actor Model", pp. 30-57.

•

"Elements of Groupthink on the Road to War” pp. 104- 120.

Hitchens, Christopher. Realpoltik in the Gulf: A game gone tilt , Jan 1991 Harper’s

(

-

B. The Invasion of Iraq 2003 [ ADDED]

The Bush administration came into office apparently determined to take military action against
Saddam Hussein and 9/ 11 produced the rationale for an invasion. Since military action seems to
have been part of the ideology of the neo conservatives during the first Bush Administration, it is
difficult to pin point a moment when the President took the final decision and what were the
reasons for the invasion and what specific objectives were set down to would determine when
US forces could withdraw. The war in Iraq stands with the war in Vietnam as the two major
military conflicts that were decided voluntarily by the president -neither war had to be fought .
The class will consider whether there were similarities in the flawed decisions that were made
and in the make up and capacities of the major advisers to the President.
Readings:

Packer, George. “The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq . (2005) Chapter 2: Fevered

Minds, pp. 39-65.

Fallows, James, " Blind Into Baghdad," The Atlantic Monthly, Jan/ Feb 2004.
Dobbins, James, "Who Lost Iraq ? Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, 2007

13
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Class Preparations: Read the required reading. Write a short paper (300 words)
comparing the decision making styles the approach of GIIW Bush and GW Bush in
preparation and conduct of these two wars in Iraq . How did their approaches differ and
how were they similar in working with allies, with the UN , with the US Congress and
American people, and with the enemy - Saddam Hussein . Three of you will be asked to
provide the historical background for a simulation of an NSC meeting that in the fall of
2010 on US policy toward Iran. There will also be a secret ballot class election on who will
play the role of President Obama in the simulation of the NSC decision making session on
Iran. [ CHANGED|

Monday, December 6, 2010 - CLASS 13
The Simulation of A Critical Presidential Decision -- Iran

(

Iran challenges the US Government to manage diplomatically and politically several issues in the
new international order, including: ( 1 ) the potential and real conflict or competition between
Islam and the West over Middle East and other issues, (2) the management of non-proliferation
and nuclear power in this new age, and (3) the relations of state power to non -State actors
( terrorists), particularly in the volatile regions of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the
Subcontinent. In the case of Iran, these complex issues must be discussed against a backdrop of
deep mutual distrust and profound misunderstandings exacerbated by the lack of contact. This
session will be a simulation of the challenges to the President in seeking to shape a US policy
that will be effective and not bring unacceptable unanticipated consequences. .
Readings:

^

•

Luers, Pickering and Walsh, “How to Deal with Iran” The New York Review of Books,
February 12, 2009 pages 45 48.

•

Freedman, Lawrence. “A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East.”
(2008). Chapter 4: Revolution in Iran. pp. 62-84.

•

Algiers Accords, January 19th, 1981

•

Additional up-to-date readings will be recommended when we get closer to the
simulation.

-

Class Preparation: Read the required reading and do additional reading to prepare for the role
you will play of a real person attending the NSC meeting. One member of the class will serve as
President Obama and each of the other senior advisers will be represented by one class member .
In the simulation the individual class members should seek to adhere as close as possible to the
policy recommendations and points of view that the actual person (Secretary Clinton, Secretary
Gates etc) would have to represent given the position they hold and the establishment they
represent . Four of the class will be called on to brief the class on the context for current US
policy toward Afghanistan to prepare for the final class and final simulation . There will be a
class election on who will play the role of President Obama for the simulation on Afghanistan .
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Monday, December 13, 2010 - CLASS 14
\ The Simulation of a Critical Presidential Decision - Afghanistan
President Obama has asked his national security team to prepare for him by December 2010
recommendations on US policy toward Afghanistan. This “review” of US policy will be much
discussed in public during the fall months and many non -governmental studies are likely to
become available with recommendations to the Obama administration on how to deal now with
the longest military conflict in US history. The class in this second simulation will be dedicated a
mock NSC meeting that will review a recommendation for the President . The President will have
to make the final decision based on the discussion. Each student will represent a different real
member of the NSC than in the simulation on Iran.

Class Preparation: The reading for this class is likely to come from articles and public
reports that have yet to be written. The professor suggests that each of you become familiar
with Robert Woodward’s new book, Obama’s Wars. Many articles will be published in
magazines and on line in the late fall that address the internal debate in the Obama
administration over policy on this most important foreign policy issue that the President
has to face . Each student will want to become fully familiar with that debate from October
to December and particularly learn in detail about the individual he/shc will be
representing in the NSC meeting. No written work will be required for this session.

ICHANGED 1
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